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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and
for securing to the individual ... the right 'to be let alone.' Instanta-
neous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechani-
cal devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whis-
pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
A suicidal teenager puts an emergency call into 911. When the
police arrive, they are accompanied by the camera crew of a television
tabloid show following the real life events of police officers. Police
arrive at a rock star's house accompanied by a camera crew of NBC's
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
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Hard Copy. Employees at a psychic hotline business have their private
conversations secretly recorded and videotaped by a hidden camera
located in the black felt hat of an undercover reporter working for a
news magazine show.
These scenarios are based on actual lawsuits brought by plaintiffs
against "tabloid television"2 programs.3 In most of these cases, plaintiffs
sued tabloid television defendants for intentional infliction of emotional
distress 4 or invasion of privacy.5 Although an invasion of privacy cause
of action seems the most direct response against the intrusions of tabloid
television, uncertainty persists whether plaintiffs can recover using this
approach. Tabloid television producers defend against such lawsuits by
waving the First Amendment flag, arguing that these lawsuits are "pre-
cluded by [their] constitutionally recognized and protected First Amend-
ment right to gather news."6 Media defendants further argue that
Supreme Court decisions protect the publication and broadcast of truth-
ful information and that imposing liability would have a "chilling effect"
on the exercise of their First Amendment rights.7
This Comment analyzes whether an individual's privacy rights in
the types of situations described in the opening scenarios are sufficiently
protected by an invasion of privacy tort action without infringing the
First Amendment rights of tabloid television defendants. Specifically,
the Comment will analyze the viability of suing the tabloid media
defendant under an "intrusion upon seclusion"8 approach and/or a "pub-
lic disclosure of private facts"9 claim.
2. The meaning I attach to the term "tabloid television" is what Andrew Jay McClurg
describes as "reality television:" "a genre of television programming often featuring live video
coverage of dramatic events. Popular segments include footage of police officers stopping,
questioning, searching, or arresting motorists, and emergency response teams, such as firefighters
or paramedics, responding to calls for assistance." Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law
Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989,
991 n.1 (1995).
3. See David Kidwell, Girl Sues TV Show for Airing Rescue Call, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23,
1994, at IB; Gail Diane Cox, Privacy Frontiers at Issue: Unwilling Subjects of Tabloid TV Are
Suing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1; Gail Diane Cox, 'Psychic' Staffers Vanquish ABC, NAT'L
L.J., July 18, 1994, at A8 [hereinafter Cox, 'Psychic' Staffers].
4. See KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 433-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d
Dist. 1995) (holding that issue of material fact existed as to whether reporter's disclosure to minor
children that their neighbor murdered her children who were playmates of the minors and then
committed suicide constituted outrageous and extreme conduct intended to cause emotional
distress); Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 681-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1986).
5. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. at 678-81.
6. Id. at 683.
7. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975).
8. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
9. See id. § 652D.
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Part II of the Comment discusses the privacy tort's original formu-
lation and evolution into four distinct causes of action. Part III of the
Comment briefly demonstrates how the "intrusion upon seclusion" and
"public disclosure of private facts" approaches may be successfully used
against the tortious acts commonly associated with tabloid television
defendants. Part IV discusses the internal constraints and constitutional
limitations placed on invasion of privacy actions. Part V analyzes how,
despite these limitations, the invasion of privacy action remains a viable
option for plaintiffs. The Comment concludes with the realization that
while Supreme Court decisions weaken the effectiveness of the "public
disclosure" claim, recent state and federal court decisions and the
Supreme Court's narrow holdings in invasion of privacy cases make the
"intrusion" cause of action an effective weapon against tabloid television
defendants.
II. THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION OF THE PRIVACY TORT AND THE
ENSUING HISTORY
Tabloid television shows devoted to hidden cameras, live camera
ride alongs, and dramatic recreations are a relatively recent phenome-
non. Concerns about an over-intrusive press, however, have enveloped
legal debate for over a century." ° In their historic law review article,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis declared that "[tihe press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency."" Warren and Brandeis concluded that the law "affords a
principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual
from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or
the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
scenes or sounds."' 2 In essence, Warren and Brandeis argued for a tort
cause of action which would be invoked to protect an individual's
privacy.
There is speculation that the impetus behind Warren and Brandeis'
article sprang from Warren's displeasure over press coverage surround-
ing his social life.' 3 In a deeper sense, however, noted scholar Robert
Post argues that Warren and Brandeis' right of privacy refers "to the
forms of respect that [individuals] owe to each other as members of a
common community."' 4 The different privacy tort claims that arise
10. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96.
I. Id. at 196.
12. Id. at 206.
13. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 295-96 (1983).
14. Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation,
41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 647, 651 (1991).
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from Warren and Brandeis' article, Post also notes, protect a commu-
nity's "rules of civility."'1 5 For example, a landlord who installs an
eavesdropping device in the bedroom of his neighbors, a husband and
wife, violates the community "rules of civility" and may be held liable
for an invasion of privacy.' 6
In this vein, Warren's and Brandeis' argument can be read as a
normative articulation of what levels privacy and respect an individual
should receive in the community. A violation of this sense of normative
privacy and respect by the "too enterprising press" directly harms "'the
mental peace and comfort of the individual and may produce suffering
much more acute than that produced by mere bodily injury. :" 7 Thus, in
one of its earliest formulations the privacy tort was a direct response to
what was deemed an over-intrusive and over-prying media, whose
actions went beyond gathering news and stepped into the private life of
the individual.
By 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court accepted the Warren-Bran-
deis formulation and recognized the existence of a distinct right of pri-
vacy action.' 8 In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., an
insurance company was sued because it made use of the plaintiff's name
as well as a false testimonial without his consent.'9 The Georgia
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
complaint and declared "[a] right of privacy ...is ...derived from
natural law."2° With the recognition of the "invasion of privacy" tort in
the 1939 Restatement of Torts, more states began to follow the lead of
the Pavesich decision in recognizing a privacy right cause of action.2'
With the inception of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the
1960s, William L. Prosser earmarked four distinct invasion of privacy
causes of action:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
15. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 959 (1989).
16. See id. at 959-61 (citing Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964)).
17. Post, supra note 14, at 652 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L.
REv. 343, 363 (1915)).
18. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
19. See id. at 68-69.
20. Id. at 70.
21. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1960).
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4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name and likeness.22
These four privacy torts still constitute the modern "privacy"
causes of action. Moreover, the "intrusion" and "public disclosure of
private facts" torts are specifically applicable against the tabloid TV
show riding along with the police and paramedics.
III. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVACY TORTS
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B states that "[o]ne
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. 23 Comment b to the Restate-
ment states that the "invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place
in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces
his way into the plaintiff's room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiffs
objection in entering his home. '"24 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 652D defines another tort which may cause concern for tabloid
media defendants:
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (b) is not a legitimate concern to the
public.25
Both of the these torts, arguably state a valid cause of action against
tabloid TV defendants. For example, in A.A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 26
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying California law, affirmed a
district court's finding of liability against Life Magazine under an inva-
sion of privacy theory. 27 Photographers of the defendant news maga-
zine, entered the office portion of the defendant's house by subterfuge,
and without consent, photographed, recorded and transmitted his conver-
sations to third persons. 28
In Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.,29 a heart attack victim's
wife sued a television network and a local television news producer
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
23. d. § 652B.
24. Id. at cmt. b.
25. Id. § 652D. I will hereinafter refer to this cause of action as the "public disclosure of
private facts" or "public disclosure" tort.
26. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. See id. at 250
28. See id. at 245-46.
29. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).
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when a camera crew entered her apartment and bedroom without con-
sent to film the activities of the Los Angeles Fire Department.3° The
paramedics were called to the plaintiffs home to administer lifesaving
techniques to her husband. The California appellate court held that the
plaintiffs complaint stated a valid cause of action against the television
network and the news producer for invasion of privacy.3
The facts of these two cases demonstrate that the defendants could
be held liable under the privacy tort of intrusion. In both cases, mem-
bers of the media intentionally entered the plaintiffs' home without con-
sent. And in both, the defendants recorded and transmitted images of
the plaintiffs in their private settings. The Miller court concluded that
"reasonable people could regard the NBC camera crew's intrusion into
[the plaintiff's] bedroom at a time of vulnerability and confusion occa-
sioned by [the plaintiff's husband's heart attack] as 'highly offensive'
conduct. ' 32 The Dietemann court also discussed the "invasion of pri-
vacy" action within the contours of an intrusion claim concluding that it
was "convinced that California will 'approve the extension of the tort of
invasion of privacy to instances of intrusion, whether by physical tres-
pass or not, into spheres from which an ordinary man in plaintiff's posi-
tion could reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be
excluded.' ,33
Plaintiffs could also sue the media under a "public disclosure"
cause of action. Although the plaintiff ultimately argued an "intrusion"
claim in Miller, publicity was given to a matter concerning the private
life of the plaintiff. Mrs. Miller's private residence and the paramedics'
attempts to revive her dying husband were broadcast on the local
news. 34 The widespread broadcast and filming of individuals in acutely
private settings incurs liability under a "public disclosure" cause of
action. For example, an unconsented publication of a photograph
depicting a nude person represents a situation where an invasion of pri-
vacy action based on a "public disclosure" may lie.35 A Massachusetts
case held that the filming of nude prison inmates while they were des-
perately trying to hide their genital areas constituted an invasion of
privacy.36
30. See id. at 673-74.
31. See id. at 678-81.
32. Id. at 679.
33. A.A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d at 249 (quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (emphasis added).
34. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
35. See generally Myers v. U.S. Camera Publ'g Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (N.Y. City Ct.
1957) (arguing that nudity is a private fact giving rise to damages when shown beyond persons to
whom consent is given).
36. See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Mass. App. Ct. 1969).
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The privacy torts seem to represent an ideal cause of action for
plaintiffs to invoke against tabloid media defendants. The very under-
pinnings of the privacy torts in their original formulation centered on the
notion that an individual's privacy warranted some form of lawful pro-
tection against the actions of an over-intrusive press. 3 Filming the
actions of individuals in times of confusion, disorientation and personal
crisis can be deemed offensive to a reasonable person.38 A subsequent
broadcasting and disclosure of these actions to a large television audi-
ence arguably creates an additional cause of action. Thus, a ride-along
camera crew of a tabloid TV show or a local news station entering a
private home without consent may be subject to an "intrusion" and/or a
"public disclosure" action.
IV. THE INTERNAL AND FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
A. The Internal Limitations of the Privacy Torts
From its very inception, however, the reach of the invasion of pri-
vacy cause of action was limited. The original Warren-Brandeis formu-
lation listed some general limitations to the privacy tort. Warren and
Brandeis declared that "[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any pub-
lication of matter which is of public or general interest. '39 To illustrate
this point, Warren and Brandeis used the example of an individual who
suffers from a speech impediment and has trouble spelling words cor-
rectly. If a newspaper publishes these facts and the individual is a
"modest and retiring individual," in other words, if such individual is a
private person trying to lead a private life, such a publication, represents
an "unwarranted... infringement of [the individual's] rights."40 On the
other hand, if the individual was a public official or running for public
office, the publication of such facts "could not be regarded as beyond
the pale of propriety. 41
Warren and Brandeis listed two other limitations that are well-
grounded in tort law. First, "[t]he right to privacy ceases upon the publi-
cation of the facts by the individual, or with his consent."42 This is
nothing more than a reiteration of the consent defense to intentional
torts.43 For example, producers of a tabloid television show that accom-
37. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
38. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
40. Id. at 215.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 218.
43. The Florida Supreme Court, in Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977), did not hold reporters and photographers of a newspaper
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panied police officers into the home of an individual calling for assist-
ance, would not be held liable if that person knowingly signed a consent
form allowing the tabloid show to tape and broadcast any of the events
occurring in the home.' Second, Warren and Brandeis stated that there
would probably be no redress for an invasion of privacy in the absence
of damages.45
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also significantly limits invasion
of privacy actions with respect to events occurring in public places.
Comment c to section 652B ("intrusion upon seclusion") states that there
is no liability "for observing [an individual] or even taking [the individ-
ual's] photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is
not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public
eye."4 6 Similarly, comment b to section 652D ("public disclosure of pri-
vate facts") states that "there is no liability for giving further publicity to
what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye."4"
Thus, photographs of a man kissing a woman in a public market or
a man acting drunk in a public street do not create an "intrusion" or
"public disclosure" cause of action. Under the Restatement's approach,
when a tabloid TV show films a person having a heart attack in a public
park or a highway patrol officer administering a sobriety test to a drunk
driving suspect on a interstate road, neither individual will be able to sue
for "intrusion" or "public disclosure of private facts."
Media defendants have won invasion of privacy claims in state
courts under this "no invasion of privacy in a public place" rationale."
For example, in Mark v. Seattle Times,4 9 the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that a television cameraman filming the actions of a pharma-
cist indicted for Medicaid fraud through the window of a locked phar-
macy did not constitute an intrusion." The Court reasoned, in part, that
the locus of the filming was open to the public and anyone passing by
the pharmacy could have viewed the actions taped on film.5' Similarly,
an Ohio court held that a media defendant was not liable for intrusion
liable for intrusion and trespass. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that landowners impliedly
consent to such intrusions because it is customary for photographers and reporters to accompany
police or firemen. See id. at 917-18.
44. See generally Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673 (Cal. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1986) (media defendant "testified that it was standard practice in the television industry to
secure consent before entering someone's home to film").
45. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
47. Id. § 652D cmt. b.
48. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49. 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
50. See id. at 1095.
51. See id.
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for photographing a drug felony suspect in a public hallway in the sher-
iffs department. 52
One of the most significant limitations on the "public disclosure"
tort is described in the comments to section 652D stating that "[w]hen
the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there
is no invasion of privacy."53 This reflects one of the original limitations
enunciated by Warren and Brandeis. 4 Comment g to section 652D
states that "[i]ncluded within the scope of legitimate public concern are
matters of the kind customarily regarded as 'news.' ,,55 This scope of
legitimate public concern also extends to "giving information to the pub-
lic for purposes of education, amusement, or enlightenment, when the
public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what
is published. 56 If a matter is deemed "newsworthy" there can be no
invasion of privacy based upon a "public disclosure."
Furthermore, Comment h extends the newsworthiness privilege to
allow private facts of individuals to be publicized. 7 "The extent of the
authority to make public private facts is not, however, unlimited. '58 The
Restatement limits this authority where "the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would
say that he had no concern. 59
In Virgil v. Time, Inc.,60 a federal appellate court accepted the
Restatement's standard for newsworthiness. The plaintiff in Virgil was a
body surfer who sued the defendant magazine because of its article
about body surfers in California.61 The article contained references to
events in the plaintiff's non-surfing life, such as extinguishing lighted
cigarettes with his tongue, eating insects, and diving head first down a
flight of stairs.62 The court overturned the district court's summary
judgment for the defendant and remanded the case.63 Although the court
concluded that body surfing could be considered a matter of general
public interest and, thus, newsworthy, it reasoned that "it does not neces-
52. See Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195, 201 (C.P. Cuyahoga County Ohio 1986).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977).
54. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977).
56. Id. at cmt. j.
57. See id. at cmt. h.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. See id. at 1123-24.
62. See id. at 1124 n. 1.
63. See id. at 1132.
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sarily follow that it is in the public interest to know private facts about
the persons who engage in that activity." 64
On remand, however, the federal district court concluded that the
magazine's coverage of the plaintiff's odd habits and actions was
"included as a legitimate journalistic attempt to explain [the plaintiff's]
extremely daring and dangerous style of body surfing" and not "for any
inherent morbid, sensational, or curiosity appeal they might have. 65
The district court, therefore, did not hold the defendant magazine liable
for its publication of the arguably private facts of an individual.
B. The First Amendment Protections
In addition to the invasion of privacy tort's internal limitations,
media defendants possess a powerful sword to defend against invasion
of privacy suits. This sword is the First Amendment. In a comment
following the Restatement's description of the "public disclosure of pri-
vate facts" tort, the drafters acknowledged that "[i]t has not been estab-
lished with certainty that liability of this nature is consistent with the
free-speech and free-press provisions of the First Amendment to the
Constitution, as applied to state law through the Fourteenth
Amendment." 66
In fact, one can read the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Time Co. v Sullivan67 as providing almost absolute First Amendment
protection to the media's publication of truthful speech. The plaintiff in
Sullivan, a Montgomery, Alabama City Commissioner, sued the New
York Times for libel and defamation.68 The plaintiff complained that
inaccuracies contained in an advertisement published by the New York
Times defamed him. 69 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a damages
award for the plaintiff on the tort theories of libel and defamation. 70 The
Supreme Court held, however, that the state law as applied by the Ala-
bama courts was constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide
safeguards for freedom of speech and the press.7
The Court concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
still protected the New York Times' publications even if the statements
64. Id. at 1131.
65. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp 1286, 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D special note on relation of § 652D to the First
Amendment of the Constitution (1977).
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. See id. at 256-57.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 256.
71. See id. at 264.
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contained in the Times were untrue. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, reasoned that:
[t]he state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of
truth... [a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel
judgments virtually unlimited in amounts-leads to a comparable
'self-censorship.'72
Three years later in Time, Inc. v. Hill,73 the Supreme Court held
that under constitutional guarantees of free speech and press, defendant
Life news magazine was entitled to a jury instruction such that it could
be held liable only upon the finding of its knowing or reckless falsity in
publishing an article which allegedly defamed and violated the privacy
rights of the plaintiffs."4 In Hill, the plaintiffs brought an action under a
New York right of privacy statute, alleging that Life magazine falsely
reported that a theatrical play accurately portrayed the experiences suf-
fered by the plaintiff and his family at the hands of escaped convicts.75
Once again, as in Sullivan, the Court refused to impose liability on the
media defendant.76
In both Sullivan and Hill, the Court expanded First Amendment
protection to untruthful speech. Only upon a finding of knowing or
reckless falsity in publication by the media would the Supreme Court
allow state courts to impose common law tort liability on members of
the news media. If a newspaper publishes an untruthful accusation it
still avoids liability unless a court determines that the newspaper reck-
lessly published the accusation. Thus, even an untruthful accusation
printed or broadcast by the media retains constitutional protection. This
constitutional protection accorded to false speech suggests that the pub-
lication, recording, or broadcasting of accurate events, of truthful
speech, has overriding First Amendment protection.
This argument has significant consequences for the Restatement's
privacy torts. The "public disclosure" cause of action may stand in a
tenuous position in light of Sullivan and Hill. For example, returning to
our 911 call scenario, if the suicidal person sues for an invasion of pri-
vacy under a "public disclosure" theory, one prong of the cause of action
is that the private matter is "given publicity." Counsel for the tabloid
TV show can argue that the live filming of the events surrounding the
911 call is the most accurate depiction of the event possible and, thus,
represents the epitome of truthful speech. Therefore, under Sullivan and
72. Id. at 278-79.
73. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
74. See id. at 387-88.
75. See id. at 377-78.
76. See id. at 394-98.
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Hill, the First and Fourteenth Amendments arguably insulate the live
camera tabloid "news" media from tort liability because of the First
Amendment's almost overriding protection of truthful speech.
The Supreme Court decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn"
and The Florida Star v. B.J.F.78 also support this argument. In Cox, a
Georgia television station broadcast the name of a deceased rape victim
in violation of a Georgia rape-shield statute.79 The father of the
deceased rape victim brought suit against the television station.80 The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs complaint stated a valid
cause of action for the invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy under
the tort of "public disclosure."8
The Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court's deci-
sion. The Supreme Court centered on the fact that the defendant's
broadcast of the rape victim's name was an accurate republication of
information contained in public court records. 82 The Court reasoned that
a law sanctioning the truthful publication of public court records because
of its offensiveness to privacy "would invite timidity and self-censor-
ship" on the media's part.83
Similarly, in The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,84 a privacy action was
brought against a news media defendant for publishing a rape victim's
name in violation of Florida's rape-shield statute.85 The name of the
rape victim was inadvertently disclosed in a police incident report placed
in the sheriff s department press room.86 The rape victim sued the sher-
iff's department and The Florida Star newspaper.87 The Supreme Court
reversed damages award to the plaintiff from defendant newspaper. 8
The Court based its holding on the fact that the information published
was "truthful" and "lawfully obtained."89
Arguably, Cox and The Florida Star enhance the protection of
truthful speech announced in New York Times v. Sullivan. In fact, Cox
and Florida Star represent a greater blow to the "privacy torts" because
both decisions protected truthful broadcasts and publications in the face
77. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
78. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
79. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 472-74.
80. See id. at 471, 474.
81. See id. at 474.
82. See id. at 496-97.
83. Id. at 496.
84. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
85. See FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1993).
86. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 526-27.
87. See id. at 528.
88. See id. at 529.
89. Id. at 536.
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of a plaintiffs invasion of privacy tort action. Therefore, Supreme
Court decisions, one can argue, lead to the conclusion that "truth is a
defense in a . . . right of privacy action." 90
V. RESPONDING TO THE LIMITATIONS
In the face of First Amendment limitations and broad definitions of
"newsworthiness," it may seem that the privacy torts will not serve as
viable causes of action for plaintiffs against tabloid television defend-
ants. Four powerful responses to this conclusion, however, do exist.
A. Tabaloid Television Shows Are Not "News"
First, the "newsworthiness" privilege as applied to tabloid televi-
sion shows is questionable. The Restatement's definition of "public
interest" does not include those matters which only represent a "sensa-
tional prying into private lives."9' Legal scholar, Edward Bloustein,
argues that "'[p]ublic interest,' taken to mean curiosity, must be distin-
guished from 'public interest,' taken to mean value to the public of
receiving information of governing importance." 92 The only "public
interest" gained from broadcasting a frantic suicidal person in her home
or a dying middle-aged man suffering a heart attack is either an interest
in the actions of police officers and paramedics or the mere curiosity of
staring into others' private lives. Public interest in the activities of
police officers and paramedics can be satisfied through broadcasts in
public places. The internal limitations of the Restatement's privacy torts
prevent an individual from suing a show following the real-life events of
police officers responding to an attempted suicide in a public park, or
filming paramedics responding to a car accident in a public street.
"Mere curiosity" to pry into the private misfortunes of others, however,
remains unprotected under the Restatement's "newsworthiness"
standard.
Critics respond to privacy tort advocates by noting that most courts
are reluctant to engage "in line drawing over newsworthiness and simply
accept the press' judgment about what is and is not newsworthy."93 The
argument is "that the press must in the nature of things be the final
90. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.36, at 1106 (5th
ed. 1995). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding that a state may
not punish a newspaper's truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully
obtained by a newspaper).
91. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
92. Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and
the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41, 56-57 (1974).
93. Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 353.
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arbiter of newsworthiness."94 Thus, because the newsworthiness stan-
dard may be difficult for judges to impose, the press should internally
decide its own standards.
This argument ignores that the newsworthiness standard was for-
mulated and accepted by the Restatement95 and Virgil v. Time, Inc.9 6
Mere difficulty in applying a legally recognized standard does not extin-
guish its legal existence.
Furthermore, even accepting that the press should be the judge of
newsworthiness, this provides no guidelines on which institutions are to
be accepted as agents of the news media and the press. If television
viewers watch the television show COPS only for educational reasons,
or a general interest in the lives of police officers, a television show
presenting dramatic recreations of the real life events of police officers
can fulfill these very same purposes.
Therefore, if one accepts the proposition that COPS is an agent of
the news media, then the dramatization show is likewise an agent of the
press, as is any other type of entertainment programming satisfying the
public's most general educational interests. The dramatization show
provides the same educational interests as does COPS. The only differ-
ence between the two shows is the presence of a live TV camera in
COPS. The mere inclusion of live camera crews does not automatically
elevate television coverage into "news."
If a dramatization show is "news," then most entertainment pro-
gramming qualifies as "news." Thus, to prevent an overbroad categori-
zation of what is considered "news," a dramatization show cannot be
classified as "news." If a dramatization show is not considered "news"
then, logically, neither can COPS, which serves the same educational
and entertainment purposes, considered "news." Therefore, a tabloid
television show such as COPS should be precluded from asserting a
newsworthiness defense because it does not represent "news"
programming.
B. Supreme Court Decisions Do Not Bar Invasion of Privacy
Tort Actions
Second, the argument that Sullivan immunizes the media from lia-
bility for the publication or broadcasting of truthful speech is overbroad.
The Sullivan holding was explicitly limited to protecting critics of offi-
94. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966).
95. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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cial conduct and public officials from libel judgments.97 If, on the other
hand, the media is covering a story about a private individual, a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for the media does not arise.
This point is explicitly made in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.9 8 In
Gertz, the Supreme Court differentiated between the status of its plain-
tiff, a private lawyer, and the plaintiff in Sullivan, a public official.99
The Court held that a news magazine could be held liable for publishing
a defamatory falsehood about someone who was not a public official if it
was negligent in publishing the falsehood. 1°°
Additionally, despite the real limitations that Cox and The Florida
Star impose on "public disclosure" claims, both decisions explicitly
avoided any claims that its holdings would obliterate invasion of privacy
actions.' ° In Cox, the Court stated that there are "impressive creden-
tials for a right of privacy" 10 2 action and purposefully avoids the
"broader question of whether truthful publications may ever be sub-
jected to civil . . . liability."103 Rather, the Court narrows its holding to
providing First Amendment protection for the media's publication or
broadcast of truthful information obtained from official court records
open to public inspection."° This limitation does not narrow the scope
of the privacy torts of "intrusion" and "public disclosure of private
facts" as they are drafted in the Restatement. Comments to both of the
above torts state that liability does not attach for an "examination" or
"publication" of public records." 5 The Supreme Court would have
reached the same decision in Cox applying the Restatement's current
approach.
In The Florida Star, the Court explicitly declared that its holding in
no way mandates "that truthful publication is automatically constitution-
ally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which
the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press."'' 0 6
Thus, in both Florida Star and Cox the Court carefully reached narrow
holdings that would not preclude future recognition of an invasion of
privacy "public disclosure" claim.
97. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
98. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
99. Id. at 345-46.
100. See id. at 347.
101. See infra notes 102-06.
102. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
103. Id. at 491.
104. See id.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B cmt. c, 652D cmt. b (1977).
106. The Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
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C. Supreme Court Decisions Protect an Individual's Home as a
Zone of Privacy
Third, the tendency of tabloid television shows to accompany
police officers and paramedics into individuals' private homes strength-
ens the arguments of potential plaintiffs. Supreme Court decisions
reflect the conception of the home as a location commanding a height-
ened right of privacy. 0 7 For example, in Boyd v. United States, the
Court interpreted the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as protections "of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. '" 08 In Mapp v.
Ohio the Court referred to the right to be free of a warrantless search of
the home as a right of privacy."0 9 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Katz v. United States declared that a "man's home is ... a place where
he expects privacy."'"0
Media advocates may argue that these Supreme Court decisions
have no place in an analysis of privacy tort actions because they only
apply to state intrusions against individuals' privacy rights. That, how-
ever, misses the point. These Supreme Court decisions serve as a reiter-
ation and recognition of the importance of the individual's home as a
zone where there exists high expectations of a right to privacy. At its
base, these decisions highlight the idea that an action by agents that
reach into an individual's home is an intrusive offense against that indi-
vidual's privacy.
D. First Amendment and "Newsworthiness" Limitations Do Not
Apply to an "Intrusion" Privacy Action
Lastly, limitations imposed by a broad newsworthiness standard or
by Supreme Court decisions providing First Amendment protection for
the publication of lawfully obtained truthful information, do not apply to
invasion of privacy "intrusion" actions. The newsworthiness standard
described in the Restatement and the Virgil case applies only to "public
disclosure" claims."1 The Restatement comments following section
652B ("intrusion upon seclusion") contain no newsworthiness privilege
absolving potential defendants from liability.
This is because the concept of newsworthiness is a standard which
evaluates the importance or non-importance of published or broadcasted
107. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
108. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
111. Virgil v. Time, Inc. was a "public disclosure claim brought against a news magazine. See
supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. Recall, also that the "newsworthiness" approach
accepted in Virgil was the standard described in the comments following the "public disclosure"
cause of action in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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material. Because an "intrusion upon seclusion" cause of action does
not require a publication or broadcast of information, the newsworthi-
ness analysis is irrelevant. Thus, while the California appellate court in
Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. acknowledged "that public educa-
tion about paramedics, as well about the use of ... (CPR) as a lifesaving
technique ... qualifies as 'news,"' this conclusion did not prevent the
plaintiff from stating a valid invasion of privacy "intrusion" claim." 2
Similarly, while the Supreme Court refused to impose liability on
news media defendants publishing or broadcasting "truthful informa-
tion" in Cox and Florida Star, courts are prevented from reaching this
same conclusion when confronted with an invasion of privacy "intru-
sion" claim. An "intrusion" claim does not lead to "timidity" and "self-
censorship" because the publication and/or broadcast of information and
events attaches no liability in an "intrusion" claim. As noted constitu-
tional law scholar Melville Nimmer points out: "[i]ntrusion does not
raise first amendment difficulties since its perpetration does not involve
speech or other expression. It occurs by virtue of the physical or
mechanical observation of the private affairs of another, and not by the
publication of such observations."'"13
This principle is supported by Baugh v. C.B.S., Inc., 4 a 1993 Cali-
fornia federal district court decision. In Baugh, plaintiffs sued a national
television broadcaster after being filmed by news reporters in their home
following a domestic violence incident." 5 The court held that the plain-
tiffs' tort claims that relied solely on the actual broadcast of the domestic
violence incident were constitutionally barred.'1 6 The court also rea-
soned, however, that First Amendment protections did not immunize the
defendant's prepublication activities, such as physically intruding into
the plaintiffs' home with news reporters and television cameras.' 17 Both
the Miller and Baugh decisions indicate that courts remain open to some
invasion of privacy actions brought against an intrusive tabloid media.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has concluded that the press "'[h]as no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' 8 Tabloid televi-
112. Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1986).
113. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 957 (1968).
114. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
115. Id. at 750-52.
116. See id. at 756.
117. See id.
118. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
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sion invades privacy rights and liberties when it accompanies police or
paramedics into an individual's home or secretly tapes conversations
without consent. Because almost all states have recognized a tort cause
of action for invasion of privacy in some form," 9 an invasion of privacy
action is a direct and viable method 2 ' of attacking the actions of the
tabloid TV media.
Privacy actions, however, relying solely on the publication or
broadcast of an individual's otherwise accurate private information may
be barred either on constitutional grounds or because it constitutes privi-
leged "newsworthy" information. Even assuming, however, that a tab-
loid television program is a member of the constitutionally protected
press, if its intrusive camera or microphone films, records, or photo-
graphs the individual in the private seclusion of his home, hotel room, or
employment office, no First Amendment protections or news privilege
defenses can work to shield the media defendant. The tabloid TV show
will not be held liable for its publication or broadcasting of information,
but, rather, for its prepublication activities.
To deny holding the tabloid media liable for an intrusive invasion
of privacy is similar to holding a local television news crew immune
from tort liability for its van intentionally running over someone on its
way to cover a big story. The Constitution does not provide the news
media this type of overencompassing immunity. In neither case did civil
liability attach for the publication and reporting of the news, but, rather,
liability only attached for unlawful tortious conduct occurring before the
news was reported.
Unconsented entries into the private homes and lives of individuals
are protected by the "intrusion" action. On the other hand, privacy tort
law still protects potential tabloid media defendants in a sufficient
number of ways. Hard Copy can still film a rock star kissing his or her
new romantic partner while walking down Beverly Hills Boulevard. A
Current Affair can still broadcast the name of a sports star and the
alleged facts involving a drug arrest lawfully obtained from police
records and public court documents. The law, however, in the form of
U.S. 103, 132-133 (1937)). See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973)
(concluding that the First Amendment does not establish a wall of immunity which protects
newsmen from any liability for their conduct while gathering news).
119. See State-by-State Guide to Privacy Law, NEws MEDIA & L., Summer 1994, at S5 (noting
that most states recognize all four privacy torts).
120. Because invasion of privacy torts are intentional torts, plaintiffs are able to recover
punitive damages against a tabloid television defendant. Recently, plaintiffs have been awarded
damages of approximately half a million dollars in invasion of privacy suits against media
defendants. See Cox, 'Psychic' Staffers, supra note 3, at A8 (plaintiffs successful in invasion of
privacy suit against ABC television show Prime Time Live).
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an "intrusion" cause of action must and does provide an individual pro-
tection from the tabloid media's most egregious behavior.
EDUARDO W. GONZALEZ
